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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is an appeal from the Order of the Third

I
Judicial District for Salt Lake County by Judge Pat B. Brian
upholding the Final Order of the Utah Securities Advisory Board
(•SAB") and the Executive Director of the Utah Department of
Business Regulation ("Executive Director" and "Department")
suspending all secondary trading exemptions of the stock of
Amenityf Inc. ("Amenity").

Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah

Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(a), as
an appeal from the District Court's review (of the „final order of
a state agency.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether appellant has met its burden relative to

the applicable standard of review of the decision of the
Department; to wit:
A.

Whether the Department•s findings of fact that

Amenity circumvented or evaded the registr ation provisions of the
Utah Uniform Securities Act (the "Act") by) distributing
approximately 90f000 shares of its stock to 900 individuals by
gift without registering the stock with tY\(e Division is so
without foundation in fact as to be arbiti ary and capricious,
B.

Whether the Department's conclusion that a

distribution of securities as indicated above constitutes an
"offer or sale" of a security is reasonable and rational; and,
C.

Whether the Department's conclusion that

Amenity failed to establish that the above-outlined distribution
of stock qualified as a "good faith gift"! excepted from the

definition of offer and sale and, hence from registration, was
unreasonable or irrational.
2.

Whether the Utah Securities Division ("Division")

and the Department have authority to suspend all trading
exemptions of a security.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
These proceedings were initiated pursuant to a
Petition, dated June 5, 1986 wherein the Utah Securities Division
alleged that the distribution of stock in a corporation
incorporated in the State of Utah on January 7, 1986, Amenity,
Incf, was in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7.

(R. 28) The

petition sought the suspension of all possible exemptions for
further trading of Amenity stock without registration pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14(3).

M*.

Memoranda were filed by the parties outlining their
positions, and on September 25, 1986, a hearing was held before
J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge (MALJM). Id. Mr.
Eklund issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommended Order on October 28, 1986. (R. 32) On January 8,
1987, the SAB and the Executive Director issued an Order adopting
limited provisions of Mr. Eklund9s Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, but specifically rejecting the ALJ's
determination regarding the issue of whom the registration
provisions are to protect, and his determinations concerning
whether the disposition of Amenity stock constituted a good faith
gift* (R. 22-25)

(Any reference by appellant to portions of the

ALJ's findings or conclusions is reference to only a proposed
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finding or conclusion, and carries no weight lor authority.
page 7.)

See

The January 8th Order of the Department called for an

evidentiary hearing to be held on January 201 1987, for the
limited purpose of receiving evidence as to whether the
distribution of Amenity stock was an effort to frustrate or
circumvent the registration provisions of the Act, and the Ordej
enumerated certain factors that should be addressed in making
such a determination.

(R. 24, 25)

On January 20, 1987, at 3:00 p.m., a hearing was held
before the SAB.

After consideration of the (evidence produced at

the January 20th hearing, the SAB and the Executive Director
issued an Order on February 18, 1987, suspen ding the use of all
secondary trading exemptions of the securities of Amenity, Inc.,
its affiliates and successors.

(R. 13).

On April 16, 1987, Capital General Corporation appealed
the Order to the District Court for review asking the court to
set aside the February 18th Order.

The District Court conducted

a hearing on September 17, 1987 and, after reviewing the briefs
on file and examining the administrative proceedings, upheld the
Final Order of the Department. (R. 108)
Capital General Corporation now appeals the matter to
this Court.

ffote P P ftccyrecy Of The Record

In its Brief with this

Court, appellant makes a claim that the rec lord of this case below
is not accurate or complete because such fa ils to indicate that a
hearing was held on June 19, 1986 where the parties allegedly
stipulated to a set of facts.

Appellant th en enumerates a set of

3 -

facts it claims are the facts Amenity and the Division stipulated
to in the alleged hearing before the Division on June 19, 1986.
Appellant Brief at 3-5.

Also, in footnote 1 on page 4f appellant

indicates it does not believe the respondents will deny its
stipulation "because to do so would throw yet another error in
the proceedings . • ••"
While it is unclear why appellant would be making these
allegations unless it is attempting to restrict the Division to a
more favorable "set of stipulated facts," nevertheless, appellant
makes no claims that the facts reviewed by the judicial bodies in
this case are in violation of any "stipulation," or that any
other tacts besides its "stipulated facts" are not properly
before this Court for its review.

Nonetheless, appellant takes

issue with any disavowal the Division might make concerning any
stipulation.
Counsel for the Division on this appeal was not counsel
at the administrative level and is unaware of any alleged
stipulation, nor are any documents filed with the Division
indicating any alleged stipulation was agreed upon by parties.
Most importantly, there is no indication in the record that any
hearing was held on June 19, 1986. The original Petition filed
by the Division against Amenity attached a Notice of Action that
indicated a hearing was scheduled for June 19, 1986, however, no
hearing ever took place on that date. (R. 28, 75)

Thus, the

Division denies any stipulated set of facts were arrived at
between parties during any hearing on the above date.

- 4

If appellant believes that a stipulation was
consummated between parties indicating that a particular set of
facts was to be before the Department, appellant should have
objected to the facts considered by the judicial bodies as being
outside the scope of any stipulation! or alternatively, should
have entered the "stipulated facts1- on the

ecord at the hearing.

No where in appellant's memoranda filed with the Division does it
raise this issue*

In fact, in appellant's Memorandum in

Opposition to Memorandum of the Division filed with the
Department on August 7, 1986, (two months after the alleged June
19 bearing,) appellant discusses its belief as to the accurate
facts before the Department and never raise|s the issue of any
stipulated set of facts.

(R. 42)

The Division has no desire to haggle over this alleged
problem.

If there truly was a stipulated set of factsf the

Division would willingly accept whatever impact that may have on
the case.

However, there is nothing to reflect any such

stipulation or set of facts. This whole matter is in fact a moot
issue because the Department held its own evidentiary hearing
wherein evidence beyond that indicated in appellant's litany was
received to address additional matters. And, the evidentiary
proceeding was not objected to by appellan t nor could it do so
with any legal tenacity because administra ^ive proceedings are to
be conducted with flexibility, informality and are to be
liberally construed and easily amended,

gbe pilcher v. State

Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983)*

- 5 -

If appellant does not believe the record accurately
reflects the facts and proceedings below, appellant is welcome to
litigate the issue and have the record set straight.

The

Division would appreciate any proper supplement to the record if
it is not fully accurate.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Amenity, Inc. was incorporated in the State of Utah on
January 7, 1986.

(R. 28)

On January 8, 1986, 1,000,000 shares

of Amenity stock were issued to Capital General Corporation (CGC)
in exchange for $2,000.00 cash. Id.

At least two of the officers

and directors of CGC were incorporators and directors of Amenity,
l&i. The $2,000.00 received from CGC was the only asset of
Amenity at the time of the filing of the Division's petition, ld^
After receiving the 1,000,000 shares of stock, CGC
issued 100 shares of stock to approximately 900 different
individuals and organizations. (R. 29)

Those who received stock

were people who had invested with CGC in the past, and friends
and relatives of the principles of CGC. IJLI. According to CGC,
the purpose of the stock distribution was to reward past
association and loyalty, and the general exposure of CGC's
financial consulting business to persons in the financial world.
Id.

In other words, the purpose, according to CGC, was the

creation and/or maintenance of goodwill. Id.
remaining 910,000 shares of Amenity stock.

CGC retained the

Amenity did not file

a registration statement prior to the distribution of the shares.
CGC engaged in a major campaign of incorporating over
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30 1 other companies and causing them to go public by distributing
its shares to a wide range of shareholders in a similar fashion
I
to Amenity. (R. 18) In the summer of 1986, Amenity Inc. was
acquired by Elkin Weiss and Companies Inc. Id.
additional companies have also been acquired

Two of the 30
They are Olympus

Enterprises, now Florida Growth Industries, line, and ¥ Travel,
now H & B Carriers, Inc. Id.
CGC was instrumental in the acquisition of Amenity,
Olympus, and Y travel by the acquiring companies and received
$25,000.00 for its role in each acquisition. Jd.
300,000 shares of stock in Elkin Weiss.

QGC maintained

At the time of the

hearing in January, Elkin Weiss 1 unrestricted stock was trading
for around $3.00 a share.

(R. 118 Transcript at 27)

The

Department thus found that the purpose of the distribution of
Amenity stock was to circumvent or evade thje Act and the
registration provisions contained therein.

(R. 18)

On page 8 of his brief, appellant! refers to a finding
by the ALJ that the gift of stock by Amenity was made in good
faith.

Appellant's reference to the finding by the ALJ carries

no weight or authority since the determination by the ALJ is only
* In fact, CGC incorporated approximately 148 companies and
caused them to go public in the fashion de gcribed above. The
exact number was not known to the Division at the time of the
hearings, however, another case has been f led with the
Department concerning the other 47 compani s, and a decision
concerning that case is pending. See, In e H&B Carrier?, et al.
Admin. Case No. 97-09-28-01 (filed Dec. 1, 1987). It is
interesting to note that, at the district court, appellant
claimed that the number of companies invol ed in the scheme was
overstated by the SAB and that it was in e ror. (Disrict Court
Brief at 15) The truth is that the SAB un erstated the number of
companies involved by 17.
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a proposal that must be affirmed or adopted by the SAB and the
Executive Director. U.C.A. § 61-1-14(3).

Unless the Department

adopts the ALJ's findings and conclusions, the determinations by
the ALJ are without any effect whatever.

Thus, appellant's claim

that the finding of the ALJ that the gifts were made in good
faith is misleading and improper.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The standard of review is whether the Department Order is
arbitrary and capricious.
This Court reviews the administrative decision rather
than the district court's order.

Appellant has the burden to

show that the administrative Order was arbitrary, capricious,
irrational and unreasonable in order for this Court to overturn
the decision.

Mere difference of opinion concerning the

correctness or propriety of the decision is not sufficient to
overturn it.

The Order by the Department suspending all trading

exemptions was arrived at in a rational, analytically
satisfactory manner as evidenced by statutory and common law, and
the findings of the Department were based upon substantial,
competent evidence.
The law applicable in this case is Mspecial law," as
defined by case law, and the SAB is required to apply its
technical expertise in interpreting such law in order to render
its decision.

The law requires reviewing courts to apply great

deference to such technical expertise.
Appellant has failed to meet its burden of proof to
show error by the administrative agency, and therefore, this
Court must uphold the Department's decision because it was
rational.
- 8 -

2. The purpose of the Act is to protect the public, one means
of such protection is through the registration requirements.
The major thrust of the Uniform Securities Act is to
protect the public in its dealings in the securities market.

One

of the ways such protection is furthered is through the Act's
requirement that all securities offered or sold in this State
must be registered with the Division.

The registration

requirements provide, among other things, information to the
public concerning the security and those issuing it.
3. The distribution of Amenity's stock was unlawful because it
was not registered with the Division.
The Act provides that it is unlawful to offer or sell
any security in this state unless it is registered with the
Division, or the security or transaction is exempt.

The Act also

defines "offer," "sell" and "sale" to include every disposition
of a security for value.
Appellant claims that Amenity's disposition of its
stock is excepted from the Act's registration requirements
because the securities were bona fide gifts to the recipients.
That is, the distribution of the stock by "bift" is not a sale,
and therefore, no registration of the securities in such a
distribution is required.
Clearly, a "gift" of a security constitutes a
1
disposition of the security, and thus it is an "offer" or "sale

if it is a disposition for value.

Case law and two examples

provided in the Act indicate that a disposition by gift can be
for value, and in this case, the creation of a public corporation
by gifting securities to 900 individuals is a disposition for

• 9 -

value.

Obviouslyf the gifting of securities for value is

required to be registered with the Division unless otherwise
exempted.
The Act provides that a "good faith gift" is an
exception to the definition of an "offer" or "sale," and thus,
appellant claims, it is an exception to the registration
requirements.

Regardless of the accuracy of that claim,

appellant bears the burden of proving to the Department that what
Amenity had done constituted a good faith gift in order for
Amenity to assert that the disposition did not require
registration.

A "good faith gift" is not any and all types of

gifts—it is a particular type of gift, and the Department has
the authority to determine what it is pursuant to its legislative
grant of authority and in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
Appellant failed to convince the Department that its
transaction was a good faith gift of securities.

It must now

show that the Department was unreasonable and arbitrary in its
denial of the claim to the exception.

The case law and analyses

appellant provides fails to show error by the Department in its
determination that the distribution of Amenity stock was not a
good faith gift.
The Department found that Amenity disposed of its
securities in an effort to circumvent the registration
requirements of the Act.

The Department then concluded that a

good faith gift is a bona fide gift given in good faith, i.e.,
without intent to circumvent the purposes of the Securities Act
and its registration requirements.

Such a determination is
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reasonable, is supported by case daw, and is an application of
special law to which reviewing courts are to give great
deference.
3. The SAB and the Executive Director have authority to
suspend all trading exemptions.
The Legislature determined that the proper manner to
protect the public in its dealings with the securities market is
by requiring that all securities disposed of for value must be
registered with the Division unless otherwise exempted.

When

securities are distributed to the public without such
registration, the Division has a duty to act quickly and

L

effectively to prevent further trading of the securities.

One

resource provided by the Legislature to protect the public from
the unlawful trading of illegally distributed securities is by
suspending any exemptions that might be improperly claimed by one
attempting to trade such securities.
Appellant's claim that the Division must wait until an
exemption is claimed by an individual before it can act to deny
or revoke such a claim is not founded on any such requirement in
the statute, and it ignores the practical realities the Division
faces in its regulation of the securities market.

An after-the-

fact attempt by the Division to declare that the person was in
error when he thought he was trading his securities under a
proper exemption does too little too late in protecting the
public.
Pursuant to the legislative mandate to protect the
public by the exercise of its authority, toe Division acted to
protect subsequent purchasers of Amenity's stock by suspending
• 11 -

all trading exemptions on the stock in Utah.

For the Division

not to so act would be a derogation of its duty to the public.
Such an act by the Division is clearly within its authority, and
to prevent the Division from so acting would result in
substantial harm to subsequent purchasers who act in reliance on
the expectation that the Division is properly regulating the
securities market in Utah.

The public cannot be as adequately

and promptly protected in any other way than by the Divisionfs
action under S 61-1-14(3).
ARGUMENTS
POINT I. APPELLANT MUST SHOW THAT THE DEPARTMENTS
FINDINGS OF FACT ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE UNREASONABLE
The scope of review of the Department's decision by
this Court is limited to determining whether the administrative
decision is reasonable and rational and is not arbitrary.2

This

Court has had occasion to review a decision by the Executive
Director and the SAB in the case of Technomedical Labs* Inc. v.
Utah Securities Div.. 744 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1987).

In that

case, this Court set forth the following standard of review
applicable to this type of administrative decision:

in Vtah Pep't offtdfnjp,Servf y, Pufrlic Serv*
Comm'n. 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983)f the Utah
Supreme Court outlined the three standards of
review to be applied to decisions of
administrative agencies generally. The standard
2 While this appeal is from a decision by the district court,
this Court reviews the administrative decision as if the appeal
had come directly from the agency. Technomedical Labs. ?nc. v.
Utah Securities Division. 744 P.2d 320, 321 (Utah App. 1987), and
Bennion v. Utah State Board of Oil, Gas & Mining. 675 P.2d 1135
(Utah 1983).
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which applies in the instant case is that of
reasonableness or rationality. Included under
this standard are agency questions on "mixed
questions of law and fact" and agency
interpretations of "special law." "Special law"
is defined as "the operative provisions of the
statutory law [the agency] is empowered to
administer, especially those generalized terms
that bespeak a legislative intent to delegate
their interpretation to the responsible agency."
Jd. at 610. Deference is afforded to the
expertise and experience of the agency in its
interpretation of key provisions of a statute it
is empowered to administer. Under this standardf
the agencyfs decision will be set aside "only if
it is outside 'the tolerable limits of reason,'
or 'so unreasonable that it must be deemed
capricious and arbitrary.1" Id. at 612. (quoting

silver Beehive Telephone c<?> V> Public Servt
Comm'n. 30 Utah 2d 44, 46, 512 P . W 1327 # 1328,
(1973); Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 29 Utah
2d 9, 11, 504 P.2d 34, 36 (1972))J
There is no question that the law|involved in this case
is "special law," and that "deference is afforded to the
expertise and experience of the agency in its interpretation" of
the law; the Legislature specifically indicated such in a note to
the 1983 Supplement of the Utah Securities Act.

Immediately

preceding S 61-1-1 of the Utah Securities Abtf U.C.A. (1983
Supp.), the legislature presented the purpose of the Utah
Securities Division as follows:
Title of Act.
An act relating to securities providing for
a securities division to adminipte r and enforce
state securities laws: authorizing the division
to set registration and examination fees;
modifying bond requirements for registered broker
dealers and investment advisors; providing
summary powers to deny registration applications;
modifying coordinated filing requirements;
limiting extension period on summary orders;

providing End Fpdjfying definition; pipviding and
modifying exemptions from registration: providing
for a securities advisory board; increasing
interest charges for violations brought by
private litigants; providing additional penalties
- 13 -

for securities violations; increasing the ceiling
on criminal fines for violation of securities
law; and authorizing the division to classify
specific acts as unlawful.
See also, Laws of Utah, Chapter 284 at 1108.

(Emphasis added.)

The statutes at issue in this case are clearly within the
categories provided above, and thus are "special law."
Regarding the findings of fact by the Department, the
Utah Supreme Court held in Administrative Services that findings
on questions of basic fact may be overturned by the reviewing
court "only where they are 'so without foundation in fact1 that
they 'must be deemed capricious and arbitrary.1" 658 P.2d at 608
(emphasis in original).

And the findings must be upheld "if

'there is evidence of anv substance whatever' which can
reasonably be regarded as supporting the determination made."
Id. (emphasis in original)•
Thus, under the above standard of review, this Court
must uphold the Department's decision unless appellant can
demonstrate that such decision was not based on any evidence
whatsoever, was irrational and unreasonable, and was not done in
pursuit of the Division's legislative purpose of protecting the
public through the administration and enforcement of the State's
securities laws.
POINT II. THE DISTRIBUTION OF AMENITY STOCK VIOLATES
THE PURPOSES OF THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT BECAUSE
IT WAS DISPOSED OF WITHOUT REGISTRATION
A. Iptrpdpctiop
Since the review of the administrative decision below
will be governed by the "reasonableness or rationality" standard
as indicated above, in order to aid this Court in its application
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of the test for reasonableness, a brief discussion of the intent
and purposes of the Utah Uniform Securities Act ("the Act") is in
order.
The Utah Supreme Court in Payable Accounting Corp., v.
McKinley. 667 P.2d 15,

(Utah 1983) noted thit -[securities laws

are remedial in nature and should be broadly and liberally
construed to give effect to the legislative purpose*"

In

Technomedical Labs, Inc t . this Court stated that "Itlhe purposes
of securities acts in general are to prevent fraud and to
encourage disclosure of information through registration, thereby
protecting investors from the sale of fraudulent and worthless
speculative securities."

744 P.2d at 322.

And, in Utah Code

Ann. S 61-1-27, the Legislature stated that

Itlhis chapter may

be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact it and to co-ordinate
the interpretation and administration of thils chapter with the
related federal regulation."
The Minnesota Supreme Court in th^ case of State v,
Borface, 288 N.W. 13, 16 (Minn. 1939) stateq that the clear
purpose of the Uniform Blue Sky Laws "is to curb the activities
of those who by ingenious subterfuge or by fraudulent means seem
bent on disposing to the ignorant and gullible, fraudulent or
speculative securities."
In the case of SEC v. Harwvn Industries Corp.. 326

J
F.Supp 943, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) the court noted;
lilt is readily apparent that the Harwyn spinoffs violated the spirit and purpose of the
registration requirements of S 5 of the 1933
Act, which is to protect investors by promoting
- 15 -

full disclosure of information thought
necessary to informed investment decisions,
• • • Furthermore, the registration
provisions are designed not only to protect
immediate recipients of distributed securities
but also subsequent purchasers from them*
(Citations omitted.)
From the forgoing cases it becomes apparent that the
purpose of the registration provisions of the Act is to protect
the public through full disclosure, and that the Act should be
broadly and liberally construed in order to curb the abuse of the
registration provisions of the Act through subterfuge or fraud.
!•

Registration Requirements of the Act
The Act provides protection to the public by requiring

the registration of securities to be offered or sold in the
State, or an exemption to such registration must be established.
Such registration can be carried out through various types of
disclosure requirements:

Sections 61-1-8, 9, and 10 of the Act

provide three separate vehicles for the registration of an
initial public offering (IPO); Section 61-1-14 is the section
dealing with exemptions from registration.
a. Disclosure Required Under An IPO
Under the Act, a private corporation that wishes to
become public can examine and select one of the requirements of
the three initial registration sections which best coincides with
the goals and objectives of the company.

Typically, all three

nethods require the disclosure of the following:
the principles behind the company, their past business
history, and a disclosure of any significant criminal or
civil action which has been taken against them;
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the capital structure of the company with recent financial
data and disclosure of ownership both before and after the
public distribution of the security;
a discussion of the company's business history, business
purpose, and prospects for the future;
In addition, any individual obtaining a share of the security in
the public distribution is required to be furnished a prospectus
and sign a subscription agreement.

The inf prmation provided the

investor in the prospectus must contain all relevant information
that a reasonable investor would require in order to make an
informed investment decision*

Both the mak:ing of material

misrepresentations and the failure to make adequate disclosure
are actionable under the fraud provisions of the Act.

(See S 61-

1-1)
After a given registration has b^en approved by the
Division and become effective, recipients of the initial offering
can trade the security for up to a year's time.

Once the

registration time period has run, the recipients of the security
cannot trade the security unless they obtain a trading exemption
under § 61-1-14. U.C.A. S 61-1-11(8).

b. Exemptions Frppt Registration Pequirfercents
Section 61-1-14 provides approximately 28 different
situations in which the registration requirements of 61-1-7 are
inapplicable, and subsection 2 of 61-1-14 pertains to some 17
transactional exemptions which are the type of exemptions
applicable to this case.

Note that there are only three

subsections within 14(2) that call for additional information to
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claim an exemption from registration in trading a security, and
only two of those could be applied in this case: subsection
14(2)(m) provides for disclosure for trading of the security when
it is a non-issuer transaction effected by or through a broker
dealer; subsection 14(2)(b) exemption provides for disclosure
through recognized securities manuals. But, 14(2)(b) and (m)
exemptions do not cover all situations in which securities
trading may take place, and the other exemptions under 14(2)
(except 2(p)) do not require any disclosure of information.
The disclosure required in 14(2)(b) and (m) is
information which supplements and updates the disclosure required
for the initial registration, and it typically requires only that
the names and addresses of the principals of the company, the
name of the registered agent, a brief business history, and a
recent unaudited financial of the company be provided.
Thus, the information provided through an exemption
under subsections 14(2)(b) and (m), is at best limited, because
it does not call for the same disclosure required in an IPO,
instead, it calls for supplemental and updated disclosure for
secondary trading of an already registered security.

Given that

the purpose of the registration provisions of the Act is to
protect the public through full disclosure, a scheme of
distribution which creates a public company and avoids the
requirements of initial registration and its accompanying
disclosure violates the purpose of the Act.
2.

Whom is Registration to Protect?
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Appellant argues that by Amenity distributing its stock
through gifting to a broad range of individuals, the initial
registration provisions of the Act are inapplicable because the
initial recipients have not paid anything for the stock received,
and do not need any protection.3

Such an argument ignores the

aim of the registration requirements.

The court in Harwyn

indicated that disclosure requirements exist for a broader
purpose than that claimed by appellant: "the| registration
provisions are designed not only to protect immediate recipients
of distributed securities but also subsequent purchasers from
£h£R*m
added).

Harwyn Industries Corp,. 326 F.Supp at 953 (emphasis
Thus, the protection afforded to the public by the

registration requirements applies to the trading of securities in
general, not to any particular party involved in the trading.

3 A significant point is that the anti-frauc| provisions of U.C.A.
S 61-1-1 apply to the trading of a security whether or not it is
required to be registered. Subsection 2 of S 61-1-1 provides
that it is unlawful to omit to state a material fact in
connection with the offer or sale of a security. The donees of
Amenity stock who attempt to trade it under a 14(2) exemption
would likely be in violation of S 61-1-1 becpause there is no
information whatsoever available concerning the company that
enables the purchaser to make an informed investment decision,
unless the company itself provides the type of information
disclosed in an IPO to the donees or other buyers. A
donee/seller will find himself in the difficult position of
explaining that he supplied all the material facts to the buyer
that were necessary concerning the security when he attempted to
sell it, when in fact no information was available.
It is unlikley that the donees of Amenity stock are aware of
the applicability of S 61-1-1 to an attempt on their part to
trade the security (if they are aware of Sfol-1-1at all). In
the January 20, 1987 hearing, a representative of CGC testified
that CGC made a concerted effort to reach persons uneducated as
to investing in securities when it carried put the distribution
of Amenity and like company stock. (R. 118 Transcript at 31# 35,
36)
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The argument presented by appellant shows a callous
disregard for those who need protection provided by the Act.
Under the Amenity scenario, the initial recipients of the stock
are provided no disclosure concerning the company other than that
which the gifting company may feel compelled to provide. They
are thus placed in jeopardy when they attempt to sell the
securities to another because they lack the type of information
that may be necessary to avoid the anti-fraud provisions of S 611-1•

In all likely cases, the sale of Amenity stock by the

initial recipients will be done without providing the information
to the purchasers that is necessary for trading, and thus, the
subsequent purchasers will purchase stock in a company that has
not had to disclose anything about itself.

Or, if trading is

conducted under a 14(2)(b) or (m) exemption and information is
provided, it is information of questionable benefit absent the
information required in the initial registration.

Nevertheless,

the subsequent purchasers of the stock make their purchases under
the assumption that the stock has passed through the initial
registration process, and therefore, the necessary steps have
been taken for public protection.
The effect of such a dangerous sequence of events has
already transpired in the present case.

After becoming a

publicly held company by the gifting process, Amenity was merged
with a private company, Elkin Weiss, Inc.

Elkin Weiss maintained

the name "Elkin Weiss, Inc." and began trading on the secondary
market.

Significant information about Elkin Weiss's background

was not required to be disclosed in the secondary trading of the
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Amenity-Elkin Weiss security, such as the pait business history
of the company, the background of the principals of the companyr
and whether the principals have a history of criminal conduct in
fraudulent activities, etc.

Subsequent pure hasers of Elkin Weiss

stock purchased it under the assumption that the initial
registration requirements of a public distri frution would cull out
such information and inform those making the initial purchase of
the stock.

Individuals purchasing in that instance were

indubitably relying on the State's duty to r egulate the trading
of securities to protect them from securities with questionable
backgrounds.

The Act surely was not crafted to allow what

actually transpired.
POINT III. THE DISTRIBUTION OF AMENITY STOCK WAS
REQUIRED TO BE REGISTERED WITH THE DIVISION BECAUSE
IT IS AN OFFER OR SALE AS DEFINED BY THE ACT
In their Final Order, the Department found that the
gift of Amenity stock was done for consideration, and thus was an
offer or sale of a security as defined by the Act. (R. 19)

The

Department also concluded that no registration of the security
was sought or granted, and that Respondent failed to prove that
any exemption or exception such as a ••good faith gift" applied to
render the security exempt from registration. Id,

The Board thus

concluded that the distribution of the stock of Amenity was in
violation of the Act. Id.

As was stated above, appellant must

prove that such a conclusion was unreasonable, not rational, and
that there was no evidence to support the findings upon which the
conclusions are based.
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A.

The Distribution Of Amenity Stock Constituted An Offer Or

Pale As Defined By The Act
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-7 states that Milt is unlawful
for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless
it is registered under this chapter or the security or
transaction is exempted under 61-1-14.-

Section 61-1-13(15)(a)

and (b) provides:
"Sale11 or "sell* includes every contract for sale
off contract to sellf or disposition of. a
security or interest in a security for value.
•"Offer" or "offer to sell* includes every attempt
or offer to dispose of. or solicitation of an
offer to buy, a security or interest in a
security fpf value»
(Emphasis added.)

The facts present a situation wherein Amenity

distributed approximately 90f000 shares of its stock to 900
persons by giving it to them in order to create a publicly held
corporation.

The Department found that such a distribution

constituted an offer and sale of a security as defined by the
Act. (R. 19)

While most of the discussion has focused on whether

the distribution by Amenity was a "sale" as defined in S 61-113(15), in fact, the attempt by Amenity to dispose of the stock
by gift also constituted an "offer" of a security.

l.

Offer
Black's Law Dictionary at 975 (5th ed. 1979) defines

"offer," in part, as follows:
To bring to or before; to present for acceptance
or rejection? to hold out or proffer; to make a
proposal to; to exhibit something that may be
taken or received or not. To attempt or
endeavor; to make an effort to effect some
object, as, to offer to bribe, in this sense used
principally in criminal law.
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(Emphasis added.)

Thus, the act invuiveu

tiitr y x v i n g

m

Of

Amenity's stock to the 900 recipients constituted an offer of the
security.

It certainly was an attempt to di spose of the

security. (The discussion concerning whether a "disposition for
value11 can be by gift shall be addressed later.)

In addition, in

order for one to give something to another, the gift must be
offered, and if the gift is to consummate, t|he offer of the gift
must be accepted by the recipient.

Nothing |in the facts of the

case indicate that the recipients of Amenity's stock were forced
to receive and accept the stock? that they tfad no choice in the
matter.

It is clear that the giftees could either accept the

gift (or the offer of the gift) of stock or reject it. Thus, the
offer to give the stock was a presentation for acceptance or
rejection, or an exhibition of the security that could be taken
or received or not, and was thus an "offer to dispose" according
to the definition provided above.

If the disposition by Amenity

involved an offer, S 61-1-7 requires that the security be
registered with the State.

The acceptance pf the argument here

that the gifting of Amenity stock involved

r

n offer leaves behind

the issue raised by appellant that a gift c annot be a sale, and
thus no registration was required for the d istribution; the Act
requires registration for an offer as well as the sale of
securities.

However, the consummation of the gift of Amenity

stock by the offerees acceptance of the offer constituted a sale
as defined by the Act.

2. £ai£
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Regarding the question of whether the disposition by
Amenity constituted a "sale,*

one should bear in mind that the

terms "sale" and "sell" are to be broadly construed.

In

interpreting statutes virtually identical to U.C.A. $ 61-113(15)(a), courts have held:
These terms "sale" and "security" are to be given
liberal construction. United States v. Moniar*
47 F.Supp 421, 426(12) (D.C.Del. 1942, aff'd. 147
F.2d 916 (3rd Cir.), cert. den. 325 U.S. 859, 65
S.Ct. 1191, 89 L.Ed 1979.
The term "sale" or "sell" is not limited to
technical common-law sales, or transactions
ordinarily governed by the commercial law of
sales. Spector v. L.O. Motor Inns. Inc., 517
F.2d 278, 286, (5th Cir. 1975), Dasho v.
Susquehanna Corpft. 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert.
den. 389 U.S. 977, 88 S.Ct. 480, 19 L.Ed.2d 470
(1967).
Peoples Bank of LaGrange v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank 228 S.E.2d
334, 338, 139 Ga.App. 405 (1976).
Clearly a gift of a security is a disposition of the
security.

Black's Law Dictionary defines "disposition" to be the

"lajct of disposing; transferring to the care or possession of
another.
property."

The parting with, alienation of, or giving UP
Black's Law Dictionary at 423 (5th ed. 1979)

(emphasis added).

In addition, other cases have held the word

"disposition" in various statutes to include a transfer by gift:
£££, e.g. Bayer v. United States 382 F.Supp 576, 580 (N.D.Ohio
1974)i Litch v. People ex rel. Town of Sterling, 75 P 1079, 1080,
19 Colo.App. 421 (1904).
Hence, a "gift" of a security constitutes a disposition
of the security, and thus it is a "sale" within the definitions
provided in S 61-1-13(15)(a) if it is a disposition of the
- 24 -

security for value.

Appellant argues that a gift cannot be a

sale; that the Act in no way contemplates th^t a gift could
constitute a sale.

However, S 61-1-13(15)(cj provides a number

of "examples" of what would constitute a sale of securities, and
the first two examples presented are dispositions of securities
by gift.

(See, 61-l-13(15(c) (i) : "any bonus siiL£li;" and (ii): "<

purported gift of assessable stock.")
B. Distribution Of Amenity Stock Was A Disposition For Value
A significant question here is whether the distribution
of stock by Amenity was a disposition for value.

The Department

determined that there was a disposition for value. (R. 19, 23,
30)

Its determination was that value was rejceived because the

distribution was done for the "creation and/or maintenance of
good will and the resulting beneficial exposure of [CGCl's
business in various areas represents the valtue envisioned by
10.C.A. § 61-1-13(15)(a) and (b)l.

See lifidjkburn

Yt IpppUto

ElAi_# 156 So.2d 550 (1963); King et. al. vsJ Southwestern Cotton
Oil Co.. Okla. App., 585 P.2d 385 (1978).

(R. 30)

Cases that support the conclusion that disposition of
Amenity stock was done for value are not lacking.

Perhaps the

most compelling case to support this finding is Technomedical
Labs. Inc.

In Technomedical. this Court cited two federal cases:

S.B.C. v. Harwyn Industries (cited supra), imd g,ptC» V.
Datronics Engineers. Inc.. 490 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1973) as
support for its affirmation of the Department's decision.

While

the issue in Technomedical was whether "benefit11 was received by
the company creating spin-offs, in fact, thp cases relied on by
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this Court pertain to the question of "value" in the same sense
being addressed here: what constitutes a disposition "for value"
and thus, a sale requiring registration.

Technomedical stated

the following:
In Datronics and Harwyn. the courts were asked to
decide if the distribution of a subsidiary's
unregistered shares as a dividend to the parent's
shareholders constituted a "sale" requiring
registration under the Federal Securities Act of
1933 C1933 Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 77b. Whether a
"sale" had occurred depended upon whether the

<3istrit?vtion wes "for Yalv*ef" poth courts held
value would be gained by the creation of a public
market. Datronics. 490 F.2d at 253-54; Harwyn,
326 F.Supp. at 952-953. Such value includes: 1)
an enhanced ability to borrow; 2) an enhanced
ability tQ raise equity; 3) the availability Qt fl
jnetfrod of valuing eggetg; 4) »P ?Pfrapcefl
liquidity Of gpgets? ppfl 5) the ppegtige
associated with publicly held companies. The
Department concluded the term "value" in Harwyn
and Datronics is substantially synonymous with
••benefit" in the instant case.
744 P.2d at 324 (emphasis added).
Clearly, the disposition of the stock by gifting to
some 900 shareholders resulted in the creation of a public
corporation, and thereforef value was received.

Amenity greatly

benefited from the public distribution of the stock.

Not only

was goodwill created or maintained as acknowledged by Petitioner,
but Amenity received the value of becoming a public company
without the disclosure or the restrictions of the registration
process.

As a public company, Amenity received enhanced ability

to borrow money, raise capital and became a ripe target for
acquisition.

In addition, CGC received $25,000 as commission

from the merging of Amenity with Elkin Weiss, and also received
approximately 300,000 shares of Elkin Weiss stock, which was
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trading at one point for about $3.00 a share.
received by its distribution.

Thus, value was

Appellant cannot in any way

demonstrate that such a conclusion by the SAB was unreasonable.

c*

Appellant's Cages Are Npt Analogous An<V0r Are Not Applicable
Appellant disputes the claim that a gift is a

disposition for value in that appellant views the category of
•gift" to be beyond the reach of the statute , and he cites
several cases in support of his theory.

App ellant's perspective

on the issue of gift v. sale is fatally flawed and the cases
cited by appellant are not analogous to this case.
For example, appellant relies heavily on an early Utah
Supreme Court case, Andrews v. Chase, 49 P.?d 938 (Utah 1935), as
support for his analysis that a gift is simply not a sale, nor
can it be.

There are some serious problems with appellant using

the Andrews case as support for his position.

One problem is

that the facts in Andrews are significantly different than the
present case.

In the Andrews case, the gift of treasury stock

took place because the company intended on levying assessments on
the stock to finance the development of its' mining property,
Neither the aim nor the effect of the distr:ibution was to create
a publicly held company.

In the present case, it is irrefutable

that the purpose of the gifting of the stock was to create a
public corporation (to be discussed below).
Another problem is the potential for significant harm
to the public that can occur from a broad reading of the Andrews
decision as urged by appellant.

The dissenting opinion in

Andrews spends a great deal of time on the issue of the problems

- 27 -

inherent in the giving of assessable stock to the public, the
potential for fraud created thereby, and the belief that the
gifting of assessable stock is a disposition for value.
at 943-945.

49 P.2d

The following statement by Justice Hanson in his

dissent expresses his feelings about the harmful applications of
the Andrew? decision.
tilt is clear that the disposition of the copper
company's stock, as alleged, would be a sale for
value within the definition of that term as
stated in • • • the Blue Sky Law. Certainly such
a disposition was an attempt to dispose of a
security for value. It may be conceded that a
gift of stock does not come within the purview of
the Blue Sky law. But, as herein shown, to call
the arrangement described in the complaint a
bestowing of gratuitous issues of stock, is
begging the question and fails to distinguish
between form and substance. |f this court gives
legal sanction to such a plain and palpable
attempt to evade the intent and purpose of our

constitutional snd statutory prpyisiPPPr then
indeed will the doors be wide open to every one

yfrp mey resort to the specious expedient Qt

making "gifts* of stock. The law would be
nullified: the legislative regulations intended

.to protect the public, ypuid be inpperative; and
additional impetus would be given to the ever
present tendency to invent means to circumvent

gycfr regulations*
49 P.2d at 945.
No more persuasive statement could be made by the
Division than that made by Justice Hanson that such attempts to
evade statutory requirements ought to be struck down.

While in

the present case the 6tock given to the public was not
assessable, the intent to circumvent the legislative requirement
of registration is just as palpable.

Fortunately, the

potentially disastrous result that could be felt by the ftpdrews
case should courts construe it in the manner urged by appellant
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was thwarted by the changes the Leaislature made to S 61-1-13 of
the Act in 1963 and in 1983.
In spite of what appellant claims, the statute
applicable at the time of the Andrews case is not the same as it
is today4 , and the amendments to that statute prove a
Legislative intent to overrule the Andrews decision.

The fact in

Andrews relevant to the changes made in the amendments of the Act
is that the type of stock given out by the company in Andrews was
assessable stock.

In its enactment of the Utah Uniform

Securities Act in 1963# the Legislature, in giving the
definitions to the Act provided that "A purported gift of
assessable stock is considered to involve an offer or sale."
U.C.A. S 61-1-13(10)(d) (1965 Supp.)

Such an amendment was

clearly enacted to overturn the ruling by the Utah Supreme Court
in Andrews.

If there was any ambiguity in that statute as

drafted by the 1963 Legislature, the 1983 Legislature eliminated
any question as to its possible interpretations by providing
that: MA purported gift of assessable stock i£ an offer or sale,
as is each assessment levied on the stock.N
13(14)(c)(ii) (1983 Supp.) (emphasis added.)

U.C.A. S 61-1The 1983

Legislature also amended 61-1-13 to exclude from the definition
of sale a -good faith gift."

U.C.A. S 61-lh-13(14) (d) (i) (1983

Supp.) provides "The terms defined in subsections (a) and (b) do
not include: (i) A good faith gift.11

It is clear that the

*
The Utah Uniform Securities Act was not adopted by this State
until 1963, and thus, much of the policy applicable to the
Uniform Securities Act was not applicable to the Utah statute in
effect in 1935.
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amendment to the definitional section of the Act by both the 1963
and 1983 Legislatures is pointed directly to the Andrews
decision.
In his brief, appellant spends considerable time on the
"plain meaning" doctrine of statutory construction to support his
claim that the plain meaning of the statute does not contemplate
that a gift is a sale. The above discussion clearly indicates
that the Legislature did intend that a gift could constitute a
sale because it specifically provided for examples in which gifts
are sales, and it provides a type of gift excepted from a sale.
Additional support for the conclusion that Andrews was
overruled is found in the rule of statutory construction that
requires a presumption of legislative intent to overrule
conflicting case law when statutes are amended:
The general rule of statutory interpretation
that a provision in an act is to be read in its
context, is applicable to the interpretation of
amendatory acts. '• • •
The legislature is presumed to know the prior
construction of the original act or code and if
previously construed terms in the unamended
sections are used in the amendment, it is
indicated that the legislature intended to adopt
the prior construction of those terms. . . .
If the section as amended is inconsistent

y.ith prior judicial interpretation of related
sections. It is presumed that the legislature

Knew iti and the amendment controls^
1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.35 at 296 (4th ed. 1985
rev.) (footnote references omitted).

Thus, appellant's reliance

upon Andrews places him in the unenviable position of arguing a
case specifically overturned by legislative amendment.
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Appellant may claim that the effect of overruling
Andrews related to the issue of assessable stock only.
it is clearly more logical to conclude that

However,

he issue overruled

by the amendment dealt with the attempt to circumvent
registration requirements by gift, because,

good faith gifts1

was an exception to the general rule specifically created by the
1983 Legislature.

Thus, the legislature did not want to require

the registration of all types of gifts, as could be interpreted
by the amendment, so it gave an exception to the general rule and
excluded good faith gifts. As will be discussed below, the
distribution by Amenity of its stock was not a good faith gift.
The other cases relied on by appellant regarding this
issue are wholly inapplicable to the present case.

Appellant

cites Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F.Supp. 387 (iS.D.N.Y. 1948), and
Shaw v. Dreyfus. 172 F.2d 140 (2nd Cir. 1949), as support for his
assertion that gifts of securities cannot constitute sales
requiring registration.

However, neither case involves a

situation remotely related to the present case; the statute and
issues involved have nothing to do with the registration of
securities.

Rather, suits by stockholders of the corporations

were commenced to recover corporate profits from the subsequent
sales of stock warrants issued to employees of the respective
companies.

The statute on which both cases were based was 15

O.S.C.A. S78p(b), 16(b) Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
That statute pertains to unlawful trading on insider information
and the obtaining of profits from the sales! of securities based
on the information.
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Additionallyf infiixdiir'the gift to which the term
"sale" did not apply happened to be the donation of the warrants
by the employee to various charities.

Such a situation—that of

donating publicly traded stock by an individual to a charity—
would not be a sale for which registration is required under the
present statute either.

Another glaring difference between the

facts in those cases and the present case is that the companies
involved were publicly held corporations, and the stocks were
readily traded on the market.

In those cases, the effect of

distributing warrants to employees did not create a publicly held
corporation.
Thus, appellant has failed to provide this Court with
cases to support his own hypothesis that disposition by gifts are
excluded from registration requirements within the Act.

Even if

appellant had cases to support such dogma, this Court would not
overturn the Department's Order unless appellant could show by
such cases that the Order was irrational and unreasonable.
POINT IV. DISTRIBUTION OF AMENITY STOCK WAS NOT
A GOOD FAITH GIFT AND THUS WAS NOT EXCEPTED
FROM THE DEFINITION OF OFFER OR SALE
A. Appellant Has Burden To Show Disposition Was Excepted From The
Definition of Offer Or Sale

Since the gifting of Amenity stock was a disposition
for value, appellant bore the burden of demonstrating to the
Department that the stock or the transaction was, nevertheless,
exempt or excepted from registration, or the distribution would
be in violation of the Act.

As stated in Utah Code Ann $ 61-1-

14.5: •'the burden of proving an exemption under S 61-1-14 or an
exception from a definition under § 61-1-13 is upon the person
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claiming the exemption or exception."

The ohly exemption or

exception Amenity laid claim to was the "good faith gift"
exception provided in 61-1-13(15)(d)(i) , which provides: "The
terms defined in Subsections (a) and (b) [of 61-1-13(15)1 do not
include: (i) a good faith gift; • . .."
1* Appellant Failed To Show Findings By Department Were
Without Foundation In Fact
In order to succeed on this issue before this Court,
Appellant must show that there was no evidence presented to the
Department to support its finding that "[tine distribution of the
Amenity stock was done with an intent to circumvent or frustrate
the purposes of the • . • Act. (R. 18)

Appellant claims the

decision by the SAB to deny appellant's claim to the "good faith
gift" exception is not supported by the evidence, and he
enumerates a number of factors in the recor<d demonstrating that
the gifts were done in good faith.

Appellant Brief at 24.

However, appellant's demonstration that Amenity
presented some self-serving evidence that the gifting of the
stock was done with good intentions misses the whole concept
behind the aim and purpose of the Act.

The Act does not concern

itself in this setting regarding good faith with the sincerity of
the giver but whether there has been an intent to evade the
requirements of the law.

Appellant must show that the

Department's determination that the law was intentionally evaded
is baseless.

As is pointed out in Administrative Services* the

standard of review applicable to an administrative body's finding
of fact is that such findings must be upheld if there is

"evidence vt ?ny ewfrgtance whateverr* and £an only be overturned
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if -they are *BQ without foundation in fact' that they 'must be
deemed capricious and arbitrary.*m 658 P.2d at 608 (emphasis in
original)•
The finding by the SAB that the distribution of stock
was done to circumvent the Act was based in part upon the facts
presented at the hearing specifically called for by the SAB in
order to provide Amenity an opportunity to prove its claim to the
good faith gift exception.

The additional evidence received at

the hearing on January 20, 1987, combined with the findings of
fact adopted from the original hearing, clearly provided the
Department with more than "evidence of any substance whatever•"
The evidence in support of such the finding that the
gifting was not done in good faith is as follows: Amenity was
formed in January of 1986, and on the day of its formation, CGC
purchased 1,000,000 shares of stock from Amenity for $2,000 and
became its sole shareholder (R. 28); shortly thereafter Amenity
disbursed approximately 90,000 shares to 900 individuals (R. 29);
no registration was sought or obtained for the distribution of
the stock, and thus by avoiding the initial registration process,
Amenity was able to become a public company without disclosure
(R. 118 Transcript at 17);

CGC had incorporated approximately 30

other companies during the same period of time and caused them to
go public by distributing their shares to a wide range of
shareholders in a similar fashion to Amenity (R. 118 Transcript
at 18, 30); the shareholders who received the gifts were
generally the same individuals, the names of which were obtained
from a list of CGC's clients (R. 118 Transcript at 30, 31);
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Amenity Inc., and two additional companies were acquired through
merger by private companies (R. 118 Transcript at 18, 20); CGC
was instrumental in the acquisition of those three companies by
the acquiring companies, and CGC received $25,000 for the
services it performed for each acquisition, and received 300,000
shares of Elkin Weiss stock which was trading at the time of the
January 20 hearing at $3.00 a share. (R. 118 Transcript at 27)
The SAB viewed the evidence presented at the hearing to indicate
that the gifting process committed by Amenity was not done in
good faith.
It should be remembered that this is not the typical
gift situation arguably envisioned by 61-1-13(15)(d)(i). We do
not have the case of a grandfather giving his grandson a stock
certificate, nor do we have a case of a company giving its
employees stock which had previously been registered in order to
award performance.

Amenity was a private corporation until it

publicly disbursed the stock.

It was the act of public

distribution of the stock that changed Amenity from a private to
a public corporation.

The stock was not, nor had it ever been,

registered.
There is ample evidence in the record to support the
finding that the distribution of the Amenity stock was "done with
an intent to circumvent or frustrate the pu rposes of the Utah
Uniform Securities Act and the registration provisions contained
therein,* and hence, the finding must be upheld.
2. The Conclusion By The Department Tftat The good Fg**h Gift
Exception Did Not Apply To Amenity Distribution Was
Reasonable
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In its conclusions of law in the Order dated January 8,
1987, and as reiterated in its Final Order, the SAB provided what
it determines the term "good faith gift" found in S 61-113(15(d)(i) to mean:
We find as a matter of law that the term "good
faith gift" in the context in which it is used,
i.e., in the Utah Uniform Securities Act, means a
bona fide gift of securities given in "good
faith," i.e. not given with an intent to
circumvent or frustrate the purposes of the Utah
Uniform Securities Act and, most relevant to the
instant case, the registration provisions
contained therein.
(R. 23)

Clearly, the fact that CGC had created over 30 companies

and distributed them to the general public in similar fashion to
Amenity indicates a scheme to circumvent or frustrate the
registration requirements of the Act, and therefore was not in
good faith.
Appellant continues to claim that the "good faith gift"
exception simply requires that the security be given for free,
without any strings attached.

While that may be his opinion,

such an analysis fails to indicate the irrationality or
unreasonableness of the Department's conclusion.

Since this is

an area of special law, *[d]eference is afforded to the expertise
and experience of the agency in its in its interpretation" of the
statute.

Technomedical Labs, Inc.. 744 P.2d at 323. And, hence,

the Department's interpretation can "be set aside 'only if it is
outside "the tolerable limits of reason," or "so unreasonable it
Bust be deemed capricious and arbitrary."1" Id.

Thus, unless

appellant can set forth some reasons or point to some law
indicating the unreasonableness or irrationality of the
Department decision, he cannot have the decision overturned.
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The following cases demonstrate a generally accepted
interpretation of the phrase "good faith* refers to an intention
to comply with the law, and lack of good failth indicates an
intent to circumvent the law.

For example:

"Good faith means

not acting with the intent improperly to circumvent the warrant

United States v> Eunklei^ 679 F.2d 187, 191

requirement • • .
(9th Cir. 1982);

"[Tlhis amendment was not promulgated as a

subterfuge to evade the holding of the A&P case, but rather as a
good faith endeavor to conform to the technical requirements of
Sections 8(a)(3) • . .."

Nat'l Labor Relations Board v. Bakery &

Confectionary Workers. 245 F.2d 211, 213 (3*d Cir. 1957);

-The

evidence before the Court is that CCWD acted in good faith and
without intent to evade the usury laws when it entered into the
1981 transaction."

In Re Pillon-Davey & Associates 52 B.R. 455,

461 (N.D.Cal. 1985);

M

[A] transfer or reassignment which is not

made in good faith and is intended to subve jet the intent of the
Teacher Tenure Act is in effect removal . .

•*

PanPQ Vt

Peterson. 421 F.Supp 950, 952 (N.D.I11. E.D . 1976);

"ITlhe job

abolishments were not made in good faith and were used to subvert
the civil service system.*

State, ex rel.

gpvld et altr Vt Qhig

Bureau of Employment Services. 501 N.E.2d 648, 650, 28 Ohio
App.3d 30 (1985).

In Windljpg y, CunflUlr 568 P. 2d 888, 890

(Wyo. 1977) , the Wyoming Supreme Court def ilned "good faith* to be
honest, lawful intent, the condition of acting
without knowledge of fraud or without intent to
assist in a fraudulent or otherwiise unlawful
scheme • • • •

37 -

'Good faith consists of an honest intention to
abstain from taking advantage of another, even
through the forms or technicalities of the law,
together with an absence of all information or
belief of facts which would render the
transaction unconscionable.1
(Citations omitted.)

Applying these definitions in concert with

the purpose of the registration provisions of the Act, i.e. to
protect the public through full disclosure, and considering that
the Act should be broadly and liberally construed in order to
curb the abuse of the registration provisions of the Act through
subterfuge and fraud, it becomes evident that the SAB's
interpretation not only "falls within the limits of
reasonableness and rationality," but is the only legitimate
conclusion the SAB could make in carrying out its statutory duty
to protect the public.
POINT V. UTAH SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD AND THE EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR HAVE AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND ALL REGISTRATION EXEMPTIONS
As was stated above, the Legislature determined that
the proper manner to protect the public in its dealings with the
securities market is by requiring that all securities disposed of
for value must be registered with the Division unless otherwise
exempted from registration.

If the registration provisions have

not been complied with, the trading of the unregistered
securities is unlawful, and the Division has a duty to protect
the public through the means provided it by statute.
Section 61-1-14(3) is one of the resources the
Legislature provided the Division in order for the Division to
protect the public from the unlawful trading of securities.
Section 61-1-14(3) authorizes the SAB, in conjunction with the
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Executive Director, to suspend the trading exemptions of a
security which are in violation of the Act.

The pertinent

portions of S 61-1-14(3) provides as follows
Upon approval by the executive director and a
majority of the Securities Advisory Board, the
executive director may by order deny or revoke
any exemption specified in Subsections (1)(h) or
(l)(j) or in Subsection (2) with respect to: (a)
a specific security, transaction or series of
transactions; or (b) any person or issuer, any
affiliate or successor to a person or issuer, or
any entity subsequently organized by or on behalf
of a person or issuer generally. No such order
may be entered without appropriate prior notice
to all interested parties, opportunity for
hearing, and written findings of tact and
conclusions of law, except that the division may
by order summarily deny or revoke!any of the
specified exemptions pending the final
determination of any proceeding under this
subsection. . • . The executive director may not
extend any summary order for more than ten
business days.
Appellant claims that 61-1-14(3) ban only be exercised
by the Division after someone has claimed one of the exemptions
under section 14 in trading the security,

Such a perspective

reads into the statute a requirement not prepvided therein, and
ignores the practical realities facing the Division in its
regulation of the securities market.
If a security has gotten into the hands of the public,
and it is not a lawfully distributed security because it was not
registered as required by law, there are some characteristics
that weaken the alleged value the security might have.

Those

characteristics are not usually discoverable by the general
public, and thus, the public needs to be protected from it.

Some

of the obvious problems with such a security is that since it has
not been registered, the significant information otherwise
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provided that would indicate the questionable worth of the
security is not available for public safety.

In addition, the

value of the security may be questionable because of the legal
problems attached to the illegality of the distribution.

Civil

action by the Division or other parties against the company is
likely to take place in the future, and the value of the security
because of that action will be weakened.
Appellant believes the Division cannot activate its
powers under S 61-1-14(3) until a person holding the security
chooses to trade it and at some point is required to justify any
exemption she might have claimed.

The Division's duty to protect

the public from the potential harm one may receive from
purchasing such a security is no less viable or compelling simply
because the person selling the security has not chosen to inform
the Division of her intention to claim the exemption.

The

unsuspecting public is unaware of the problems inherent with an
unregistered security, and assumes the Division has done its job
to require that all securities available in the market have been
registered by the Division or are otherwise exempt.
Unless those involved in the market are aware that the
security involved cannot be lawfully traded because no exemptions
are available from such trading, the initial recipient may sell
the security to another without ever informing the Division of
any claims to an exemption she might make.

The Division, after

the fact, then, has to find out about the transaction, try and
retrace the steps of the transaction, and seek some sort of
remedy to rectify the situation.

Appellant's argument concerning
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the proper application of subsection 14(3) amounts to a claim
that the Division cannot shut the door to the henhouse until all
the chickens are out*

And then, once the chickens have flown the

coop, the Division can merely say to the party who traded the
security that he had no legal right to trade it.

By the time the

Division has acted under such a scenario, the security is already
in the hands of one who has paid for it based upon the false idea
that it was lawfully traded.
In fact, the above scenario has happened in this case.
By the time the Division found out about what CGC did with
Amenity and the 47 other companies it created, a large number of
those companies had been merged with private companies and the
stocks in those companies had been traded on the secondary
market.

Because of the mergers, no background information about

the private companies was made available to the public.

Those

having purchased the stock on the market have bought securities
with some significant problems attached to them, among them the
questionable worth of the security now that the Division has
taken action against the companies involved.1

The ones harmed are

the ones now holding the security.
Section 14 is an attempt by the Legislature to provide
the Division with an ability to stop the trading of a security
when there is some problem with the type of transaction or the
security itself.

There are various situations in which exemption

denials can take place, of which this case is clearly one,

Summary Orders pf the Pepartment
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Appellant is dead wrong in his claim that the Division
cannot summarily suspend the exemption and then hold a hearing on
the propriety of the action after the suspension has been
ordered.

(See Appellant Brief at 34, 35.)

That is specifically

what 61-1-14(3) provides: "the division may by order summarily
deny or revoke any of the specified exemptions pending the final
determination of any proceeding.» but for not more than ten
business days. (Emphasis added.)

The Division has, in fact,

issued summary orders under appropriate circumstances in other
cases.

The power granted the Division by the Legislature to take

summary action and later conduct a hearing is specifically
addressed to the problem discussed herein.

In other words, if

the Division deems that summary action is warranted to protect
the public, the Division can deny any exemption that might be
claimed when it deems that the situation warrants it, and then
the Division must conduct a hearing to prove the propriety of the
action.
If appellant is nonplussed at this type of authority,
he must be unaware of similar authority held by other regulatory
bodies.

(For example, TRO's granted by district courts apply a

similar type of authority, and summary suspension authority is
given to the Division of Occupational and Pofessional Licensing
to suspend a controlled substance license if there is imminent
danger to public health or safety.

A hearing on the merits of

the suspension is required in that instance as it is in this
case. U.C.A. 5 58-37-6(4)(d).)

In certain circumstances, the

State needs to be provided with the power to prevent or stop the
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harm that is or can imminently be perpetrated upon the public
without having to deal with the delays inherent in the due
process rights of a hearing*

The requirements of due process are

then promptly applied to insure the rights of the accused.
Pursuant to the legislative mandate to protect the
public by the exercise of its authority, the Division acted to
protect subsequent purchasers of Amenity's stock by suspending
all trading exemptions on the stock in Utah*

For the Division

not to so act would be a derogation of its duty to the public.
Such an act by the Division is clearly w i t h ^ **« authority* and
to prevent the Division from so acting would result in
substantial harm to subsequent purchasers who would otherwise
purchase the stock in reliance on the expectation that the
Division is properly regulating the trading of securities within
the State of Utah.
The Division has alleged and demonstrated that the
distribution of Amenity stock violated S 61-}l-7 of the Act.

The

failure to register the distribution of the stock placed present
and future stock holders of the Amenity stoclk in a position of
not having received the disclosure contemplated by the Act. The
Division must act in every way it can to protect the public from
potential harm of transacting in illegal and questionable
securities.

In order to protect the public! the SAB and the

Executive Director had no choice but to suspend trading in order
to stop the continued exchange of Amenity stock without
sufficient disclosure.

A section of the Act had been violated

and, pursuant to Section 61*1*14(3), it was well within the
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authority of the SAB and Executive Director to order the
suspension*

CPNCT.PSIQP
It has been established that the Executive Director's
Final Order in this case is rational and reasonable and is based
upon compentent, material and substantial evidence.

Appellant

has failed to demonstrate error by the Executive Director in such
Order.

The State therefore respectfully asks this Court to

affirm the Order by the Department suspending all trading
exemptions of the securities of Amenity, Inc., its affiliates and
successors.
DATED this 7

day of March, 1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

WVfjLxkM B.4?cKEAN/
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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